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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken from a final order of the Second District Court. The Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), 
§ 78-2-2(4), and § 78-2a-3(2)G). 
SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff Vickie L. Ward ("Ward") contends that a fully integrated and 
incorporated Release and Settlement Agreement ("Final Agreement") was executed on 
March 29, 2001 between herself and Mountain West Anesthesia, LLC ("Mountain 
West") which supplanted an earlier March 16, 2001 interim arrangement ("Preliminary 
Agreement") covering the same subject matter - the settlement of a malpractice incident 
that resulted in serious and permanently debilitating injuries to her husband, Terry F. 
Ward. 
On appeal, Mountain West and McKay-Dee Hospital ("McKay-Dee") concede 
that the consideration called for in the Preliminary Agreement was not distributed 
pursuant to the provisions of that agreement, but rather according to the terms of the 
subsequent Final Agreement, raising a question regarding the Preliminary Agreement's 
invalidity for failure of consideration. 
Finally, there is no Utah case law recognizing the novel circular indemnity 
doctrine advanced by Mountain West and McKay-Dee. Although they equate their 
theory to the well-established mootness doctrine, this approach presents a number of 
problems since its application in this matter requires the court to engage in the 
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speculative adjudication of possible contingent actions whose existence and viability is 
tied to the outcome of the underlying case. Traditional mootness analysis addresses a 
party's ability to proceed based on presently existing facts and circumstances pertaining 
to the substance of the claim itself, not a string of speculative "what-ifs." 
ARGUMENT 
A central component of the arguments now made on appeal by both Mountain 
West and McKay-Dee is that Mountain West is not a party to or otherwise bound by the 
Final Agreement, and that the Final Agreement and Preliminary Agreement each pertain 
to different matters. The premise that they want this Court to accept is that that the 
multiple integration/incorporation clauses of the Final Agreement do not therefore affect 
a provision of the Preliminary Agreement now invoked by Mountain West to shield 
McKay-Dee from liability in this case. Both of these propositions are in error. 
A. SINCE THE PRELIMINARY AND FINAL AGREEMENTS WERE BOTH 
CONCLUDED BY THE SAME PARTIES AND PERTAIN TO THE SAME 
INCIDENT, THE LATER INTEGRATED AGREEMENT SUPPLANTS 
THE EARLIER ONE DESPITE VARIATIONS IN CERTAIN 
PROVISIONS. 
" Where a contract is integrated, the parol evidence rule excludes evidence of terms 
in addition to those found in the agreement. If a contract is unambiguous, the intentions 
of the parties must be determined from the words of the agreement. A court may only 
consider extrinsic evidence if, after careful consideration, the contract language is 
ambiguous or uncertain." Lee v. Barnes, 977 P.2d 550, 552 (Utah App. 1999) (emphasis 
added) (internal citations omitted). 
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"The purpose and effect of including an integration clause is to preclude the 
subsequent introduction of evidence of preliminary negotiations or of side agreements in 
a proceeding in which a court interprets the document." Tangren v. Tangren, 154 P.3d 
180, 183 (Utah App. 2006). 
1. Mountain West is a party to the Final Agreement. 
The integrated Final Agreement indicates that the contracting parties are Vickie L. 
Ward, Mountain West Anesthesia, LLC, John Luckwitz, M.D., and Scottsdale Insurance 
Company. (R. at 1683). It then contains a formal recital verifying that Mountain West 
has contractually provided Scottsdale the authority to negotiate and settle Vickie Ward's 
claims "on behalf of and as agent for [Mountain West]." (R. at 1684) (emphasis added). 
The basis for this authority is found in the liability insurance contract that Mountain West 
entered into with Scottsdale. (R. at 1440-1453). There is nothing in the record to 
establish that this authority was ever revoked prior to Scottsdale's representation of 
Mountain West in connection with the execution of the Preliminary Agreement or 
between the execution of that agreement and the Final Agreement. (R. 1-1909). 
In addition to the express contractual grant of authority, the parties' course of 
conduct further solidified the implication of Scottsdale's authority to act on Mountain 
West's behalf in this matter. Among other things, Mountain West's legal counsel 
personally participated in the process resulting in the Final Agreement. And in 
correspondence bearing the same date as the Final Settlement, he concedes that he 
3 
received and reviewed the contract but evidently had no objections to the language 
confirming Scottsdale's authority to act on behalf of Mountain West. (R. 1555). 
Further belying Mountain West's argument that the Final Agreement was merely 
an ancillary annuity arrangement as opposed to a comprehensive, preclusive, and 
integrated settlement is Mountain West's counsel's acknowledgment of that document as 
a Second Revised Release and Settlement Agreement. (R. 1555). If the subject matter of 
the Final Agreement was confined solely to some innocuous independent annuity scheme 
and not with likewise modifying the terms of the interim Preliminary Agreement, it 
would seem rather peculiar for the parties to characterize it as a "revised settlement 
agreement." 
Finally, Mountain West was affirmatively represented by Scottsdale in both 
instances. Mountain West is eager to recognize and accept Scottsdale's representation on 
its behalf for purposes of the Preliminary Agreement, but is now trying to distance itself 
from Scottsdale and disclaim Scottsdale's authority in connection with the Final 
Agreement. Mountain West's Br. 12-18 (June 25, 2007). Pursuant to the terms of 
Mountain West's liability policy, Scottsdale provided not only the resources for settling 
Mrs. Ward's claims and for Mountain West's legal representation, but maintained the 
authority to participate in negotiating and approving of the terms of any settlement. (R. 
at 1451). 
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Peeling away the self-serving assertions made only after the present dispute arose, 
a review of the record on appeal and the plain language of the settlement documents 
themselves makes apparent that the Preliminary Agreement was essentially an interim 
arrangement adopted by the parties pending finalization of a subsequent comprehensive 
Final Agreement. 
2. The Preliminary Agreement and the Final Agreement both pertain to 
the same subject matter. 
In addition to now disclaiming any involvement with or connection to the Final 
Agreement, Mountain West further tries to portray that agreement as pertaining to a 
different subject matter than the Preliminary Agreement by identifying some 
modifications in the terms between the two documents. While there may be some minor 
variations in terms, there can be no question that the central subject matter of each is 
identical - the settlement of Ward's claims arising from the underlying medical 
malpractice incident. 
The express purpose of the Preliminary Agreement is to settle Ward's claims 
arising from "medical care and treatment [] alleged to have caused injury, damage and 
loss to Ward on or about July 18, 2000 . . . arising out of surgery and care at McKay-Dee 
Hospital. (R. 1678). And likewise, the purpose of the Final Agreement is "the full 
settlement and discharge of all claims and actions of the Claimant... for damages which 
allegedly rose out of or due to the Incident." (R. 1683). If the Final Agreement was 
simply a separate post-settlement annuity arrangement as Mountain West claims in its 
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brief, it certainly would not contain several pages of provisions securing the release and 
discharge of claims against Mountain West or extensive recitations detailing the nature 
and circumstances of the underlying claims. (R. 1683-1686). Those would be irrelevant 
and extraneous if that were the case. 
What Mountain West seizes on to create an argument that the two agreements 
pertain to different subject matters is the variation in the method of payment of settlement 
funds - the Preliminary Agreement calls for a lump sum payment while the Final 
Agreement calls for periodic payments. That however, does not obviate the fundamental 
fact that the Final Agreement purports to be an integrated "Release and Settlement 
Agreement" (R. 1683) which the parties themselves recognized at the time as a "revision" 
of their earlier accord. (R. 1555). Indeed, by its terms it constitutes "the entire 
agreement" between the parties (R. 1692) and "there are no other understandings or 
agreements . . . between the parties." (R. 1692). 
Mountain West argues that the Preliminary Agreement remains valid and was not 
supplanted by the Final Agreement because it contains no language expressly designating 
it as preliminary. Its preliminary nature, however, is perhaps best demonstrated by the 
fact that a later agreement pertaining to the same incident was subsequently executed by 
the same parties. 
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B. ALTERNATIVELY, IF THE PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT WAS NOT 
SUPPLANTED BY THE FINAL AGREEMENT, MOUNTAIN WEST HAS 
CONCEDED OTHER FACTS ON APPEAL WHICH ARGUABLY 
INVALIDATE THE EARLIER AGREEMENT. 
"We have unequivocally held in the past that evidence of failure of consideration 
does not vary or alter the terms of a contract; it attacks the very existence of the contract 
for the purpose of proving it unenforceable. In fact, it is entirely permissible for a party 
to rescind a contract based on a failure of consideration . . . If a failure of consideration 
occurs, the contract ceases to exist." Aquagen Intern., Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411, 
414 (Utah 1998) (citing Nielsen v. MFT Leasing, 656 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah 1982)). 
In accordance with the terms of the Preliminary Agreement, the consideration 
payable to render that agreement valid was $1 million. (R. 1678). That amount, 
however, was never paid in accordance with the terms of the Preliminary Agreement. In 
fact, the subsequent Final Agreement specifically recognizes that only a fraction of the 
consideration due under the Preliminary Agreement was actually tendered, and makes 
alternative arrangements for the full and proper payment of the remainder (R. 1686). 
Both Mountain West and McKay-Dee also recognize that the consideration required by 
the Preliminary Agreement was never actually provided until the Final Agreement was 
later negotiated and executed. Mountain West's Br. 13 (June 25, 2007); McKay-Dee's 
Br. 8-9 (June 25, 2007). Consequently, the Preliminary Agreement is arguably invalid 
since the parties never implemented its terms before adopting another alternative 
arrangement. 
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C. THE SPECULATIVE CIRCULAR INDEMNITY DOCTRINE HAS NOT 
BEEN EMBRACED BY UTAH COURTS AND ITS ADOPTION NOW 
WOULD ONLY FURTHER PROMOTE COLLUSION BETWEEN 
POTENTIALLY LIABLE PARTIES AT THE EXPENSE OF INJURED 
CLAIMANTS. 
With no Utah precedent to directly support their novel circular indemnity theory, 
McKay-Dee and Mountain West try to bootstrap their position by citing to case law on 
the mootness doctrine. Mountain West's Br. 23-25 (June 25, 2007); McKay-Dee's Br. 
15-17 (June 25, 2007). This approach, however, cuts both ways, since the very upshot of 
the circular indemnity theory that they advance is to ask the court to issue what amounts 
to little more than a preemptive advisory opinion and stem presently pending legal action 
by jumping ahead and ruling on prospective ancillary claims which might ripen in the 
future. The whole notion runs afoul of the requirement that there be an actual case or 
controversy for the court's adjudication. "[A]ppellate courts do not give opinions on 
theoretical or moot matters, but only decide actual controversies." Meadow Fresh Farms, 
Inc. v. Utah State Univ. Dept. of Agriculture and Applied Science, 813 P.2d 1216, 
1221 (Utah App. 1991). 
CONCLUSION 
Since Mountain West is a party to the Final Agreement which expressly 
supersedes or integrates other earlier or alternative agreements between the parties, 
including the Preliminary Agreement, the trial court's grant of summary judgment was 
improper and this matter should be remanded for a trial on the merits on the basis of the 
Final Agreement. 
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Additionally, the premise upon which summary judgment was granted has not 
been accepted by Utah courts and would only encourage potentially liable parties to 
cooperate to deny a recovery to injured claimants. There are also other factors suggesting 
that the Preliminary Agreement may not be valid and enforceable. Consequently, the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment should be reversed and the matter remanded for 
further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this tOlU day of August, 2007. 
PRINCE YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
BY: 
Jpriathon T. Tichy 
Bradley H. Parker 
James W. McConkie II 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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RELEASE AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
This Release and Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") is made and entered into 
among Vickie L. Ward, individually and as permanent Guardian of Terry Faye Ward, an 
incapacitated adult and Conservator of the Estate of Terry Faye Ward, an incapacitated 
adult; Mountain West Anesthesia, LLC, John Luckwitz, M.D.; and Scottsdale Insurance 
Company ("the Parties"). The "Claimant" shall collectively mean Vickie L. Ward, 
individually and as permanent Guardian of Terry Faye Ward, an incapacitated adult and 
Conservator of the Estate of Terry Faye Ward, an incapacitated adult, their respective 
heirs, executors, administrators, personal representatives, successors and assigns; the 
"Insured" shall collectively mean Mountain West Anesthesia, LLC, and John Luckwitz, 
M.D.; and the "Insurance Company" shall mean Scottsdale Insurance Company. 
I- RECITALS 
A. On or about July 18, 2000, at or near 3939 Harrison Boulevard, Ogden, Weber 
County, Utah, the Claimant claims that Terry Faye Ward sustained physical injuries as a 
result of the alleged conduct of the Insured (the "Incident"). In connection with the 
Incident, the Claimant has asserted a claim against the Insured based upon tort or tort 
type claims. 
B. The Insurance Company and the Insured have entered into a liability insurance 
contract which provides that the Insurance Company shall defend the Insured against any 
claim or suit for damages arising from the Incident, has authority to settle any such claim 
or suit on behalf of and as agent for the Insured, and shall insure the Insured for such 
liability subject to the limits set forth in the contract. 
C. The Parties desire to enter into this Agreement to provide, among other things, 
for considerations in full settlement and discharge of all claims and actions of the Claimant 
against the Insured for damages which allegedly arose out of or due to the Incident, on the 
terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is agreed as follows: 
H. RELEASE 
A. Release and Discharge. In consideration of the cash payment(s) referred to in 
Paragraph M A and the promise to make the periodic payments referred to in Paragraph 
lll.B. ("Periodic Payments"), the Claimant hereby completely releases and forever 
discharges the Insured, the Insurance Company, and any and all other persons, firmst or 
corporations from any and all past, present, or future claims, demands, actions, damages, 
costs, expenses, loss of services, and causes of action of any kind or character, whether 
based on tort, contract, or other theory of recovery, whether known or unknown, including 
any and all claims for loss of marital services and consortium, which have arisen in the 
past or which may arise in the future, whether directly or indirectly, caused by, connected 
with or resulting from the Incident. This release and discharge shall be a fully binding and 
complete settlement among all Parties to this Agreement, and their heirs, assigns, and 
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successors. Nothing in this Release and the attached Uniform Qualified Assignment and 
Release shall be construed as releasing Claimant's claims against Dr. Steven J. Carabine 
and/or McKay Dee Hospital and it's employees. 
The Claimant acknowledges and agrees that this release and discharge is a 
general release. The Claimant expressly waives and assumes the risk of any and all 
claims for damages and expenses against the Insured, which exist as of this date, but of 
which the Claimant does not know or suspect to exist, whether through ignorance, 
oversight, error, negligence, or otherwise, and which, if known, would materially affect the 
Claimant's decision to enter into this Agreement. The Claimant further agrees that the 
Claimant has accepted the considerations set forth in Paragraphs III. A. and B. as a 
complete compromise of matters involving disputed issues of law and fact. The Claimant 
assumes the risk that the facts or law may be other than the Claimant believes. It is 
understood and agreed to by the Parties that this settlement is a compromise of a doubtful 
and disputed claim, and the payments are not to be construed as an admission of liability 
on the part of the Insured, by whom liability is expressly denied. 
B. Injuries Known and Unknown. The Claimant fully understands that the 
Claimant may have suffered personal injuries that are unknown to the Claimant at present 
and that unknown complications of present known injuries may arise, develop or be 
discovered in the future, including, but not limited to, subsequent death or disability. The 
Claimant acknowledges that the consideration received under this Agreement is intended 
to and does release and discharge the Insured and the Insurance Company from any 
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claims for, or consequences arising from, the injuries which allegedly arose from the 
Incident; and the Claimant hereby waives any rights to assert in the future any claims not 
now known or suspected even though, if such claims were known, such knowledge would 
materially affect the terms of this Agreement. 
C. Parties Released. This release and discharge shall also apply to the Insured's 
and the Insurance Company's past, present, and future officers, directors, stockholders, 
attorneys, agents, servants, representatives, employees, subsidiaries, affiliates, reinsurers, 
partners, predecessors and successors in interest, heirs, executors, personal 
representatives, and assigns and all other persons, firms or corporations with whom any of 
the former have been, are now, or may hereafter be affiliated. 
III. PAYMENTS TO CLAIMANT, PAYEE, AND/OR BENEFICIARY 
A. Payment at Settlement (and Amounts Previously Paid). The Insurance 
Company and the Insured have paid Three Hundred Ninety Three Thousand Three 
Hundred Thirty Three Dollars ($393,333) to the Claimant, and Claimant's counsel, Lloyd 
Hardcastle, receipt of which is acknowledged. This includes, but is not limited to, all out of 
pocket expenses, attorney fees, all medical liens, all rights of recovery, all medical 
subrogation claims, all worker compensation subrogation claims, known and unknown, 
and claims for general damages. 
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B. Periodic Payments. The Insurance Company, on behalf of the Insured, agrees 
to pay or cause to be paid the following Periodic Payments: 
(1) To Vickie L. Ward, Trustee of the Terry F. Ward Trust ("Payee"), the sum of Two 
Thousand Seven Hundred Two Dollars ($2,702) to be paid on or about the 
twenty ninth (29th) day of each month beginning on or about April 29, 2001, and 
continuing for the life of Terry Faye Ward. The aforesaid payments are 
guaranteed to be paid for a period of two hundred sixty five (265) months, with 
the last guaranteed payment to be made on or about April 29, 2023. 
(2) Should Terry Faye Ward die before April 29, 2023, then any remaining 
guaranteed Periodic Payments set forth in Subparagraph III.B.(1) shall instead 
be paid, subject to the provisions of Subparagraph III.B.(5) below, as they 
become due, to Vickie L Ward ("Beneficiary"), with the last guaranteed 
Periodic Payment to be made on or about April 29, 2023. Should Vickie L. 
Ward die before the remaining guaranteed Periodic Payments are made as set 
forth in Subparagraph III.B.(1), then all remaining guaranteed Periodic 
Payments will be made subject to the provisions of Subparagraph III.B.(5) 
below, as they come due, to the duly appointed Successor Trustee of the Terry 
Faye Ward Trust, with the last payment to be on or about April 29, 2023. 
Should Terry Faye Ward die after April 29, 2023, then monthly payments as 
set forth in Subparagraph III.B.(1) shall cease. 
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(3) To the Trustee of the Vickie L. Ward Trust C'Payee"), the sum of One Thousand 
Five Hundred Eighty Seven Dollars ($1,587) to be paid on or about the first 
(1*1) day of each month, beginning on or about May 1, 2001, guaranteed to be 
paid for a period of one hundred eighty (180) months, with the last guaranteed 
payment to be made on or about April 1, 2016. 
(4) Should Vickie L Ward die before April 1, 2016, then any remaining guaranteed 
Periodic Payments sent forth in Subparagraph !II.B.(3), shall instead be paid, 
subject to the provisions of Subparagraph IILB.(5) below, as they become due, 
to the duly appointed Successor Trustee of the Vicky L Ward Trust with the 
last payment to be made on or about April 1, 2016. 
(5) Each Payee shall have the right to submit a request to change the Beneficiary by 
filing a written request with the owner of the Annuity Contract The change will 
be effective when approved by both the owner of the Annuity Contract and the 
Annuity Issuer. Any change in the Beneficiary shall not in any way affect or alter 
any of the provisions of this Agreement 
IV. ASSIGNMENT AND FUNDING OF PERIODIC PAYMENT OBLIGATION 
A Assignment of Obligation. The Parties understand and agree that the 
insurance Company may assign Its duties and obligations to make such future Periodic 
Payments to GE Capital Assignment Corporation CAssignee") pursuant to a "Qualified 
Assignment and Release." within the meaning of Section 130(c) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986, as amended, attached as Exhibit A. Such assignment is accepted by the 
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Claimant without right of rejection and in full discharge and release of the duties and 
obligations of the Insurance Company and all Parties released by this Agreement with 
respect to such Periodic Payments. Upon such assignment, it is understood and agreed 
by and between the Parties that the Assignee shall make said Periodic Payments directly 
to the respective Payee and/or Beneficiary designated in Subparagraphs III.B.(1) and (2), 
and that the Payee shall submit any request to change the Beneficiary directly to the 
Assignee. 
THE PARTIES EXPRESSLY UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT, WITH THE 
INSURANCE COMPANY'S ASSIGNMENT OF THE DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS TO 
MAKE SUCH PERIODIC PAYMENTS TO GE CAPITAL ASSIGNMENT CORPORATION 
PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT, ALL OF THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
OTHERWISE IMPOSED UPON THE INSURANCE COMPANY BY THIS AGREEMENT 
WITH RESPECT TO SUCH PERIODIC PAYMENTS SHALL CEASE, AND INSTEAD 
SUCH OBLIGATION SHALL BE BINDING SOLELY UPON GE CAPITAL ASSIGNMENT 
CORPORATION. THE PARTIES FURTHER UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT WHEN 
THE ASSIGNMENT IS MADE, THE INSURANCE COMPANY SHALL BE RELEASED 
FROM ALL OBLIGATIONS TO MAKE SUCH PERIODIC PAYMENTS AND 
GE CAPITAL ASSIGNMENT CORPORATION SHALL AT ALL TIMES BE DIRECTLY 
AND SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR, AND SHALL RECEIVE CREDIT FOR, THE 
PERIODIC PAYMENTS, AND THAT WHEN THE ASSIGNMENT IS MADE, GE CAPITAL 
ASSIGNMENT CORPORATION ASSUMES THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
THE INSURANCE COMPANY WITH RESPECT TO SUCH PERIODIC PAYMENTS. 
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B. Annuity Funding, The Parties understand and agree that the Assignee may 
fund its obligation to make the Periodic Payments by purchasing an annuity contract (the 
Annuity Contract") from GE Capital Assurance Company (the "Annuity Issuer"). If such 
Annuity Contract is purchased, the Assignee shall be the owner of the Annuity Contract 
and shall have and retain all rights of ownership in the Annuity Contract. 
For its own convenience, the Assignee may direct the Annuity Issuer to make all the 
Periodic Payments directly to the respective Payees and/or Beneficiaries designated in 
Paragraph IILB. Each Payee and Beneficiary designated in Paragraph III.B. shall be 
responsible for maintaining his/her current mailing address with the Annuity Issuer. 
The obligation assumed by the Assignee to make each Periodic Payment shall be 
fully discharged upon the mailing of a valid check or electronic funds transfer in the 
amount of such payment on or before the due date to the last address on record for the 
Payee or Beneficiary with the Annuity Issuer. If the Payee or Beneficiary notifies the 
Assignee that any check or electronic funds transfer was not received, the Assignee shall 
direct the Annuity Issuer to initiate a stop payment action and, upon confirmation that such 
check was not previously negotiated or electronic funds transfer deposited, shall have the 
Anni3fty#«uer process a replacement payment. 
C. Status of Claimant Payees, and Beneficiaries. The Claimant, each Payee 
and each Beneficiary, as applicable, shall at all times remain a general creditor of the 
Assignee and shall have no rights in the Annuity Contract nor in any other assets of the 
Assignee. The Assignee shall not be required to set aside sufficient assets or secure its 
obligation to the Claimant, each Payee, or each Beneficiary, in any manner whatsoever. 
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D. Date of Birth. The Claimant, Vickie L. Ward, warrants and represents that 
Terry Faye Ward was born on April 29, 1958. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in 
this Agreement, if the actual date of birth is not as stated above, and if the Insurance 
Company or the Assignee relies or has relied on the accuracy of the above-stated date of 
birth in determining the amount, timing and/or duration of the Periodic Payments or the 
cost of providing them, the Insurance Company or the Assignee may take such actions as 
are necessary to reflect the correct date of birth. These actions include but are not limited 
to: 1) adjusting the amount, timing and/or duration of the remaining Periodic Payments so 
that the Insurance Company or Assignee incurs no additional cost beyond that necessary 
to purchase the Annuity Contract on the date of assignment to provide the Periodic 
Payments based on the correct date of birth or 2) recovering from the Claimant, Payee, or 
Beneficiary, as appropriate, any Periodic Payments already paid in excess of the Periodic 
Payments that could have been provided by an Annuity Contract purchased on the date of 
assignment based on the correct date of birth. 
V. NO CHANGES IN PERIODIC PAYMENTS 
The Claimant acknowledges and agrees that all, some, or any part of the Periodic 
Payments cannot be accelerated, commuted, transferred, deferred, increased or 
decreased by the Claimant or by any Payee or Beneficiary and that the Claimant or any 
Payee or Beneficiary shall not have the power to sell, mortgage, encumber, or otherwise 
anticipate all, some, or any part of the Periodic Payments by assignment or otherwise. 
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VI. ENURE AGREEMENT 
This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the Claimant, the Insured, 
and the Insurance Company with regard to the matters set forth in it. There are no other 
understandings or agreements, verbal or otherwise, in relation to the Agreement, between 
the Parties except as expressly set forth in it. 
This Agreement is intended to conform with the requirements of Internal Revenue 
Code Sections 104(a)(2) and 130. All provisions of this Agreement should be construed in 
a manner so as to effectuate that intent. 
VII. READING OF AGREEMENT 
In entering into this Agreement, the Claimant represents that the Claimant has 
completely read all of its terms and that such terms are fully understood and voluntarily 
accepted by the Claimant. The Claimant has been represented by counsel of the 
Claimant's choice. 
VIII. FUTURE COOPERATION 
All Parties agree to cooperate fully, to execute any and all supplementary 
documents, and to take all additional actions that may be necessary or appropriate to give 
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full force and effect to the terms and intent of this Agreement which are not inconsistent 
with its terms. 
IX. DRAFTING OF DOCUMENT AND RELIANCE BY CLAIMANT 
This Agreement has been negotiated by the respective Parties through counsel. The 
Parties to this Agreement contemplate and intend that all payments set forth in Section III 
constitute damages received on account of personal injuries or sickness, arising from the 
Incident, within the meaning of Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
amended. However, the Claimant warrants, represents, and agrees that the Claimant is 
not relying on the advice of the Insured, the Insurance Company, anyone associated with 
them, including their attorneys and the insurance broker placing the Annuity Contract, as 
to the legal and income tax or other consequences of any kind arising out of this 
Agreement. Accordingly, the Claimant hereby releases and holds harmless the Insured, 
the Insurance Company, and any and all counsel or consultants for the Insured and the 
Insurance Company from any claim, cause of action, or other rights of any kind which the 
Claimant may assert because the legal, income tax or other consequences of this 
Agreement are other than those anticipated by the Claimant. 
The Parties signing this Agreement, and each of them, warrant and represent that no 
promise, inducement or agreement not expressed in this Agreement has been made to 
them and that this Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the Parties and 
that the terms of this Agreement are contractual and not mere recitals. 
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The Claimant represents and agrees that the Claimant has read the Agreement and 
fully understands it, and has been advised by counsel of the Claimant's own choosing as 
to the propriety and legal effect of executing it, and neither the Agreement nor the 
compromise and settlement recited in it were induced by fraud, coercion, compulsion or 
mistake, nor is this Agreement nor the compromise and settlement made in reliance upon 
any statement or representation of any of the Parties released by this Agreement, or their 
representatives, agents or attorneys. 
X. WARRANTY OF CAPACITY TO EXECUTE AGREEMENT 
The Claimant represents and warrants that, with the exception of contingency fee 
contracts and any agreements which may exist between the Claimant and Claimant's 
counsel relative to the reimbursement of litigation expenses, no other person or entity has, 
or has had, any interest in the claims, demands, obligations, or causes of action referred to 
in this Agreement, and that the Claimant has the sole right and exclusive authority to 
execute this Agreement and receive the sums specified in it and that the Claimant has not 
sold, assigned, transferred, conveyed or otherwise disposed of any of the claims, 
demands, obligations or causes of action referred to in this Agreement. 
XL COURT APPROVAL 
The Parties agree that the Claimant will file petitions for all necessary court 
approvals, that all such petitions and orders shall be in a form satisfactory to all Parties, 
and that this Agreement will not be effective until such approvals have been obtained. 
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XII. CONTROLLING LAW 
This Agreement shall be construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah. 
Dated: 3-33-Ot /JtfJhLi^.iJLln^oL 
Dated: dk H. 
Vickie L. Ward, individually and as permanent Guardian 
of Terry Faye Ward, an incapacitated adult and as 
Conservator of the Estate of Terry Faye Ward, an 
incapacitated adult, Claimant 
V^U~£A£S-> Cj6r*~*S 
Duly Authorized Representative for Scottsdale 
Insurance Company 
Approved as to Form and Content: 
Dated: _?~2?~#/ 
7^ Lloyd ht^racastle, Counsel for Claimant 
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Uniform Qualified Assignment and Release 
Claimant" Vickie L. Ward, individually and as permanent Guardian of Terry Faye Ward, an incapacitated 
adult and as Conservator of the Estate of Terry Faye Ward, an incapacitated adult 
Assignor" Scottsdale Insurance Company 
Assignee** GE Capital Assignment Corporation 
Annuity Issuer" GE Capital Assurance Company 
'Effective Date" ^ - 5 . 7 ~ 6\ 
This Agreement is made and entered into by and 
between the parties hereto as of the Effective Date 
with reference to the following facts: 
A. Claimant has executed a settlement agreement or 
release dated 2stf^d^J»M*<rcZ , 2001 (the 
"Settlement Agreement"4) that provides for the 
Assignor to make certain periodic payments to or 
for the benefit of the Claimant as stated in 
Addendum No. 1 (the "Periodic Payments"); and 
B. The parties desire to effect a "qualified 
assignment" within the meaning and subject to 
the conditions of Section 130(c) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (the "Code"). 
^OW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing 
and other good and valuable consideration, the 
parties agree as follows: 
1. The Assignor hereby assigns and the Assignee 
hereby assumes all of the Assignor's liability to 
make the Periodic Payments. The Assignee 
assumes no liability to make any payment not 
specified in Addendum No. 1. 
2. The Periodic Payments constitute damages on 
account of personal injury or sickness in a case 
involving physical injury or physical sickness 
within the meaning of Sections 104(a)(2) and 
130(c) of the Code. 
3. The Assignee's liability to make the Periodic 
Payments is no greater than that of the Assignor 
immediately preceding this Agreement. Assignee 
is not required to set aside specific assets to 
secure the Periodic Payments. The Claimant has 
no rights against the Assignee greater than a 
general creditor. None of the Periodic Payments 
may be accelerated, deferred, increased or 
decreased and may not be anticipated, sold, 
assigned or encumbered. 
4. The obligation assumed by Assignee with respect 
to any required payment shall be discharged 
upon the mailing on or before the due date of a 
valid check in the amount specified to the 
address of record. 
5. This Agreement shall be governed by and 
interpreted in accordance with the laws of the 
State of Utah. 
6. The Assignee may fund the Periodic Payments by 
purchasing a "qualified funding asset" within the 
meaning of Section 130(d) of the Code in the form 
of an annuity contract issued by the Annuity 
Issuer. All rights of ownership and control of 
such annuity contract shall be and remain vested 
in the Assignee exclusively. 
7. The Assignee may have the Annuity issuer send 
payments under any "qualified funding asset" 
purchased hereunder directly to the payee(s) 
specified in Addendum No. 1. Such direction of 
payments shall be solely for the Assignee's 
convenience and shall not provide the Claimant 
or any payee with any rights of ownership or 
control over the "qualified funding asset" or 
against the Annuity Issuer. 
8. Assignee's liability to make the Periodic 
Payments shall continue without diminution 
regardless of any bankruptcy or insolvency of the 
Assignor. 
9. In the event the Settlement Agreement is declared 
terminated by a court of law or in the event that 
Section 130(c) of the Code has not been satisfied, 
this Agreement shall terminate. The Assignee 
shall then assign ownership of any "qualified 
funding asset" purchased hereunder to Assignor, 
and Assignee's liability for the Periodic Payments 
shall terminate. 
10. This Agreement shall be binding upon the 
respective representatives, heirs, successors 
and assigns of the Claimant, the Assignor and 
the Assignee and upon any person or entity that 
may assert any right hereunder or to any of the 
Periodic Payments. 
11. The Claimant hereby accepts Assignee's 
assumption of all liability for the Periodic 
Payments and hereby releases the Assignor 
from all liability for the Periodic Payments. 
AssiqnorrScottsdale lnsuranceCompapy 
By: 
Title 
Authorized Representative 
Assignee: G£ Capital Assignment Corporation 
By:_ 
Title 
fi. /JtfLhZ 
orizptf Representative 
i/nhn? H.nhJirl 
rd, individually and as perm 
Claimant: L 
Vickie L. War , i i i alT    r anent 
Guardian of Terry Faye Ward, an incapacitated adult 
^nd as Conservator of the Estate of Terry Faye Ward, 
.n incapacitated adult 
Approved as to Form and Content: 
Claimant's Attorney 
Lloyd Hardcastle 
Addendum No. 1 
Description of Periodic Payments 
The following Periodic Payments; 
(1) To Vickie L Want Trustee of the Terry F. Ward Thjst ("Payee"), \ht? sum of Two Thousand Seven Hundred Twa 
Dollars ($2,702) to be paid on or about the twenty ninth (29**) day of tmch month beginning on or about April 29, 
2001, and continuing for the fife of Teny Faye Ward- The aforesaid payments: are guaranteed to be paki for a 
period of two hundred sixty five (255) months, with the last guaranteed payment to. be made- on oraboutApri! 29, 
2023. 
(2) Should Teny Faye Ward dte before April 29f 2023, then any remaining guaranteed Periodic Payments act forth in 
paragraph (1) shall instead be paid, subject to the provisions of paragraph (5) below, as they become due, to 
Vickie L VWand {-Beneficiary"), with the test guaranteed Periodic Payment to be made on or about April 29.2023. 
Should Vickie L Ward die. before the remaining guaranteed Penodic Payments are made as set forth in 
paragraph (1)^ then all remaining guaranteed Periodic Payments will be made subject to the provisions of 
parajjraph (5) below, z% they come due^ to the duly appointed Successor Trustee of the Teny Faye Ward Trust 
with the last payment to be on or about April 29, 2023* Should Teny Faye Werd die after April 29T 2023, then 
monthly payments as set forth in paragraph (1) shall cease. 
(3) To the Trustee of the Vickie L Ward Trust CPayee")» the sum of One Thousand Five Hundred Eighty Seven 
Dollars ($1,587) to be paid on or about the finrt (1**) day of each month, beginning on or about May 1, 2001, 
guaranteed to be paid for a period of one hundred eighty (180) months, with th& last guaranteed payment to be 
made on or about April 1,2016. 
(4) Should Vickie L Ward dte before Aprt 1, 2016r then any remaining guaranteed Periodic Payments sent forth in 
paragraph (3), shall instead be paid, subject tothe provisions of paragraph (5) below, as they become due, to 
the duly appointed Successor Trustee of the Vicky L Ward Trust, with the last payment to be made on or about 
April 1,2016. 
(5) Each Payee shall have the right to submit a requestto change the Beneficiary by filing a written request with the 
cwner of the Annuity Contract The change- will be effective when approved by both the owner of the Annuity 
Contract and the Annuity Issuer. Any change in the Benefidary shall not in any way affect or alter any of the 
provisions of this Agreement 
Initiate 
Claimant 
Assiqnofr 
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SETTLKMKNT AGREEMENT AND GENERAL RELEASE 
V1CKJU LYNN WARD, individually and as permanent guardian of TERRY FAYE 
WARD, an incapacitated adnlL and as conservator ohhe ESTATJf OF TERRY FAYE WARD, 
an incapacitated adult (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Ward") and MOUNTAIN WEST 
ANliSTHESIA, LLC, all of its associated physicians including JOHN LUCKWITZ, M.D., and 
SCGTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY (hereinafter collectively rcrcrrcd to as "Insured11), 
and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, personal representatives, successors, agents, 
employees, indemnitors and assigns, enter into this Settlement Agreement and General Release 
(hereinafter referred to as "Settlement Agreement1*), for the consideration hereinafter set forth 
this fe^dny of March, 200L 
1. S£itl£Ulent Payments. 
Concurrently with the execution of this Settlement Agreement, Insured agrees to pay 
Ward lite lotnl sum of one million dollars (51,000,000), receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged. 
2. Release of All Claims. 
In consideration of the payment referred to above, the receipt and sufficiency of which is 
hereby acknowledged, Ward, for and on bcbalf of her heirs, administrators, successors and 
assigns, hereby releases, acquiLs and forever discharges Insured and their past, present and future 
officers, directors, stockholders, attorneys, agents, physicians, servants, representatives, 
employees, subsidiaries, affiliates, partners, insureds, predecessors and successors in interest, and 
all other persons or entities, for whose conduct they may be liable, of and from any and all 
claims, demands, damages, causes of action, suits and liabilities, which Ward now has or which 
may hereafter accrue, because of, arising out of or in any way connected with any act or omission 
committed prior to the date of this Settlement Agreement, including specifically, but without 
limitation, to medical care and trcauncnt (or the alleged lack thereof) rendered prior to the date of 
this Settlement Agreement, which medical care and treatment is alleged to have caused injury, 
damage, and loss to Ward on or about July 18,2000, at or near 3939 Harrison BoulcvardT Ogdcn, 
Weber Cuunly, Umh, arising out of surgery and care at McKay Dec Hospital. Nothing in this 
Release shall be construed as releasing Ward's claims against Dr. Steven J. Carabine, McKay 
Dee Hospital, and/or its employees. 
Ward understands and agrees that the sum paid, as specified in this Settlement 
Agrccmenl, constitutes full and complete satisfaction of all claims she now has or which may 
hereafter accrue against Insured, and ail other persons or entities for whose conduct Insured may 
be liable by reason of acts and omissions committed prior to the date of this Settlement 
Agreement and that this is a document of release of all claims including, but not limited to, 
claims for: pain and suffering; personal injury, death, permanent disability; bodily impairment; 
Ward Release 
March 2000 
Page 2 
neurological injury and damage; loss of cognitive abiliiies, loss of bodily function and function 
of organs, glands, structures, tissues and muscles; loss of consortiura; psychological or emotional 
damage, distress or anxiety; loss or impairment of earning capacity, loss of wages and salary and 
all other employment and income losses of every kind and character; hospital, surgical, medical, 
nursing and drug expenses and all other expenses arising from bodily injury or impairment; 
punitive damages; attorney fees and legal costs; and claims of every other kind and character 
against Insured and all oilier persons or entities for whose conduct they may be liable arising 
from or relating to acts and omissions committed prior to the date of tin's Settlement Agreement. 
3. General Release. 
Ward hereby acknowledges and agrees that the release of claims against Insured is a 
general release, 3ind she further expressly waives and assumes the risk of any and all claims for 
damages against insured which exist as of this date, but which Ward does not know of or suspect 
to exist, whether through ignorance, oversight, error, negligence, or otherwise, and which, if 
known, would materially affect her decision to enter into flus Settlement Agreement. Ward 
further agi\:es lo accept payment of the sum specified in this Settlement Agreement as a complete 
compromise of mailers involving disputed issues of law and fact and she fully assumes the risk 
that the facts or law may be otherwise than she believes. 
4. Warranty of Canncitv to Execute Agreement. 
Ward represents and warrants ihat no other person or entity has or has had any interest in 
the claims, demands, obligations or causes of action referred to in this Settlement Agreement; 
that she has the sole right and exclusive authority to execute this Settlement Agreement and 
receive the sum specified in it; and that she has not sold, assigned, transferred, conveyed or 
otherwise disposed or any of the claims, demands, obligations or causes of action referred to in 
this Settlement Agreement. Ward warrants that she has received no notice of any subrogation 
(?l||ims against the amounts to be paid pursuant to this Settlement Agreement and further warrants 
lital she has received no Medicaid assistance for which reimbursement may be owed pursuant to 
the Medical Heat-fits Recovery Act, U.CA, § 26-19-1, ct seq. 
5. Disclaimer of Liability. 
Ward acknowledges and agrees that she accepts payment of the sum specified in this 
Seiflcment Agreement as a full and complete compromise of matters involving disputed issues; 
that neither payment of the sum specified herein nor the negotiation for this settlement shall be 
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consUucd ns admissions of the Insured; that no past or present wrongdoing on the part of Insured 
shall bo implied by such payment or negotiation. 
(i. Ifotire Agreement and Successors in Interest, 
Ward acknowledges and agrees that this Settlement Agreement contains the entire 
agreement between herself and Insured with regard to the matters set forth in this Settlement 
Agreement»and (hat this Settlement Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of 
the executor*, administrators, personal representatives, heirs, indemnitors, successors, officers, 
directors* employees and assigns of each, 
7t indemnification. 
As consideration for the payment described rn paragraph 1 of the Settlement Agreement, 
Ward agrees to indemnify Insured from all dai7ns of Ward or others arising from or in any way 
connected with the actual or alleged acts or omissions of Insured occurring prior to the date 
hereof Ward also agrees to satisfy all legal rights for contribution, subrogation and indemnity 
and to hold the Insured harmless from all such claims, including but not limited to such claims of 
public or private health insurance companies or state or federal agencies. 
S. Confidentiality. 
Insured and Ward agree that neither they nor their attorneys or representatives shall reveal 
to anyone, other than to Ward's financial advisors, or as may be mutually agreed to in writing or 
by order of a court of competent jurisdiction, any of the terms of this Settlement Agreement, or 
any of the amounts, numbers, terms, or conditions of any sums payable to Ward as set forth. 
9, Representation of Comprehension of Document. 
In entering into this Settlement: Agreement, Ward represents that she has relied upon the 
legal advice of her attorney, who is the attorney of her choice, that the terms of this Settlement 
Agreement have been completely read and explained to her by her attorney and that she fully 
understands and voluntarily accepts them. 
10. Court Approval 
Ward wan-ants that she has filed or will file for all necessary court approvals of this 
Agreement, that may be required by law. 
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DATED this lb day of March, 2001. 
VTCTOE LYNN WARDO1 
STATU OV UTAH 
COUNTY OF _2JLAVJLS_ 
:ss. 
) 
Ou '»c ./1«£L. day of March, 2001, personally appeared before rac VICKIE LYNN 
WARD, who being first duly sworn on oath, acknowledged to me that she is the person named in 
the foregoing Sctilcmcnl Agreement and General Release, and that she executed the same as her 
own free act and deed. 
APPROVE) AS TO FORM: 
SCIIWA1J & IIARDCASTLE 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
7J7/'^J<k6r-^£^ 
HEATHER PATERAKIS 
mmPUBLIC 'STXHOFUOH 
225 SOUTH 2QQ WEST 
y * 7 FARMIMGT0N, UTAH 84025 
C0MM. EXP JULY 2. 2001 
Li^ OTD A IIARDCASTLE 
MICHAEL L. SCHWAB 
Allemcy fcr Vickie Lynn Ward 
